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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.  
1.1 Background  
Procurement policies in a country like South Africa have been targeted as a vehicle to 
achieve a range of social objectives. Public procurement allows the government to combine 
two functions, that of a purchaser in the market, and at the same time regulating the market 
through the use of its purchasing power to achieve social justice (McCrudden, 2004).  
This study aims to analyse some of the dynamics underpinning the use of public procurement 
as an instrument for industrial development. This will be done by looking at the case of 
Transnet Freight Rail’s (TFR) locomotive stock renewal programme. The R35 billion 
programme, as part of Transnet’s R300 billion recapitalisation programme is part of an 
ambitious seven-year strategy to boost rail capacity, and it has suffered several delays as a 
result of a fight between the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE), Transnet and the 
National Treasury over the evaluation criteria for the multibillion rand bids. These delays 
have serious implications for the country’s rail capacity which has not received significant 
investment in the past two decades. The lack of investment in rail capacity has constrained 
the country’s ability to benefit from the resource boom of the early 2000s (Nicholson, 2012). 
Moreover this programme forms part of the government’s R 4 trillion infrastructure roll-out 
plan led by the Presidential Infrastructure Co-ordinating Commission, which is aimed at 
unlocking employment and growth in the South African economy. The DTI has seen the 
reindustrialisation of the South African economy, in particular the resuscitation of the 
manufacturing sector, as a key to tackling persistent unemployment. In this regard, the DTI as 
part of the many iterations of the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) identified the 
procurement of rolling stock as one of the designated areas for localisation. 
Therefore, Transnet’s Competitive Supplier Development Programme (CSDP) which 
Transnet argue, lies at the heart of the request for the relaxation of evaluation criteria must be 
seen in the same light. The delay on the part of TFR and the DPE is largely informed by the 
need to incorporate supplier development provisions into the evaluation criteria. In particular, 
the two institutions aim to draw out more socio-economic benefits for the local supplier 
industry in the state-owned enterprises’ capital expenditure programme. 
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The CSDP, fully aware of the manufacturing capacity and expertise lost as a result of decades 
of underinvestment, aims to ‘localise the supply chain of imported manufactured goods or 
imported services to a reasonable level while promoting local industries and South Africa as 
an off-shore site of choice for OEM’s and multinationals procurements personnel’ (Transnet, 
Transnet Supplier Development Plan , 2008, p. 5). Moreover the CSDP aims to ‘increase 
economic growth, employment creation, skills development and broad-based black economic 
empowerment (BBBEE)’ (Transnet, Transnet Supplier Development Plan , 2008, p. 6). The 
study therefore aims to interrogate the effectiveness of the CSDP in terms of providing the 
adequate incentives to encourage learning and industrial upgrading in the local supplier 
industry. Additionally the study needs to assess the CSDP’s proposed measures that would 
assess the success or failure of the programme in delivering on some of its aims and 
objectives. The study aims to use the delay in the multibillion rand bid as a justification for 
assessing the potency of the assertions that the CSDP will bring both the commercial and 
socio-economic gains envisaged by the DPE and TFR. By doing this the study aims to 
illuminate the state-private sector relations that underpin large-scale public capital spending 
in South Africa ,and how the state’s regulations and policies alters the behaviour of other 
social actors, in particular local industrial interests.  
1.2 Overview of the Literature  
Manufacturing as an engine of development.  
Manufacturing as Nicolas Kaldor (1978) argued, has special properties which make it an 
important sector in any nation’s attempt to achieve economic development. The 
characteristics of manufacturing that make it an engine for growth and development are its 
dynamic economies of scale, strong backward and forward linkages with other sectors of the 
local economy, strong properties of learning by doing, innovation and technological progress 
(Tregenna, 2011). An added feature of manufacturing, is its ability to deal with balance of 
payments challenges, which normally beset developing economies like South Africa, as 
Figure 1.2 indicates.  
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Figure 1.1 South African Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) 2002-2011.  
 
(Source: Quantec EasyData, 2013).  
These balance of payments challenges make it difficult for South African importers of 
consumer and capital goods, to procure these goods, as a lack of tradable exports (of which 
manufacturing is often a significant part) leads to a weakening currency, which makes these 
imports much more expensive. This has implications for inflation and domestic prices, and 
ultimately the quality of life, of those, whose consumption rests on imported goods.  
Figure 1.2 South African Trade Balance 2001-2013.  
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(Source: Quantec EasyData, 2013).  
In particular, as it relates to Transnet’s supply chain and capital goods manufacturing in 
particular, Walker (2006) argues that there are various reasons why the development and 
growth of the local capital goods and service sector should be promoted and developed in the 
case of South Africa. Firstly, the developmental aspect of capital goods manufacturing lies in 
the ‘know-how’ embedded in the final manufactured product. This intangible ‘know-how’ 
created in the product development process provides the opportunity for application and 
transfer of the acquired knowledge into other related and unrelated, but technologically 
similar, activities along the value chain (Walker, 2006 ) (Amsden, 2001). This process 
facilitates the emergence of new high tech industries, thus further spurring on the virtuous 
cycle of innovation which lies at the basis of development (Schumpeter, 1934).  
Secondly a vibrant local capital goods industry provides a competitive edge to the industries 
which buy its output as inputs. The productivity improvements associated with competitive 
suppliers, not only improve output, but an innovative supplier industry also gives the 
underlying industries downstream, the necessary cost-savings to commission new plants 
and/or projects with significant employment and output gains (Walker, 2006 ). This can only 
be possible through technological progress in the manufacturing processes of the supplier 
industries. The flourishing of such a virtuous innovative environment in South Africa has 
been stalled by a low level of SOE investment and anaemic levels of capital formation in 
South Africa generally (see Figure 2.1). Similarly, Tregenna observes that, decreases in the 
rate of capital formation lead to a decline in the share of manufacturing, since a 
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disproportionately large share of capital investment expenditure is dedicated to 
manufacturing (Tregenna, 2011).   
Lastly, and more importantly, manufacturing has large employment multipliers. Walker 
argues that although capital goods manufacturing requires advanced skills and technology, 
the manufacturing of machinery and other activities incidental to capital goods manufacturing 
such as component manufacture and fabrication further down the supply chain are labour 
intensive (Walker, 2006 ). Walker goes on further to argue, that while competitively priced 
inputs, a skilled workforce and reliable services are important factors at firm level, the 
success of the sector is determined by the strength and stability of local demand, and the 
ability of the local supplier industry to meet the end-user’s requirements in a competitive and 
cost effective manner (Walker, 2006 ) 
 
Industrialisation and Deindustrialisation.  
Many scholars, have written about industrialisation. A recurring theme amongst many of 
these writers, is the representation of industrialisation as a transition from an agrarian system 
of production and exchange, towards an industrial economy characterised by innovation and 
technological process. The West Indian scholar, W.A Lewis, was one of the first scholars 
from a developing country, to write of the experience of industrialisation from that vantage 
point. Using data on long-term demographic trends he argued that as land resources and the 
primary sector would reach their capacity point due to larger populations, non-agricultural 
opportunities had to be created in the manufacturing sector (Lewis, 1953). This population 
problem was earlier highlighted by British economist and scholar, Thomas Malthus, who 
argued that population growth would quickly outstrip the existing stock factors of production 
such as land, and this presented a long term limit on human progress. Lewis’ argument on the 
role of manufacturing in absorbing surplus labour from the countryside supports the emphasis 
placed by Kaldor on manufacturing as an engine of growth and industrialisation. In 
particular, many of these scholars highlighted the importance of state investment.  
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) argued, assuming the indivisibility of demand, savings supply and 
an indivisible production function, that a ‘big push’, in the form of large investments is 
integral in pursuit of economic development. More importantly, Rosenstein-Rodan argued 
that economies of scale and thus industrial progress, could only be achieved with investments 
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in social overhead capital. Social overhead capital refers to investment in basic infrastructure 
such as power, telecommunications and transport networks, which are needed before any 
accompanying private sector industrial investment is made. Rosenstein-Rodan argued that 
such investments needed to be made in one fell swoop, in order to ‘crowd-in’ private sector 
investment. This ‘crowding-in’ thesis is also shared by Lewis in his essays on Carribean 
Industrialisation, and outlines the thinking which informed much state development thinking 
in most of the 20th century.  
Neoclassical analyses on economic and industrial growth, focus on the market or sphere of 
exchange whilst assuming that the price mechanism is the best allocator of resources. The 
neoclassical tradition, which favours neither industrialisation nor state intervention in the 
economy, argues that countries all lie on the same production function and should simply 
settle on the appropriate level of their capital/labour intensity according to their factor price 
ratios and areas of comparative advantage (Jayanthakumaran, 2000). Neoclassical analysis 
here, are compared with the protectionist ‘infant industry’ industrialisation model, and other 
import substituting models which in essence ,according to neoclassical theory, interfere with 
the ‘perfect’ functioning of the market. Erik Reinert (2012) argues, that neoclassical theory 
represents a return to the colonial postulates of David Ricardo, which argues that what a 
nation produces , be it industrial technology or subsistence agriculture, do not matter. 
Furthermore, the theory assumes full employment of resources (which is seldom the case in 
developing countries), and the perfect mobility of factors of production between countries. 
The neoclassical analysis also views state intervention, as inefficient and market distorting. 
However, recent developments in neoclassical literature on development highlight the 
importance of market failures in undermining the classical trade postulates put forward by 
Ricardo. Justin Lin argues that, having taken into account the reality of market failures in 
undermining the ‘perfect’ assumptions made by the neoclassical tradition, there is scope for 
state intervention aimed at removing binding constraints to facilitate private sector market 
entry into industries where there is a comparative advantage (Lin, 2011). Lin draws a 
distinction between two kinds of state intervention, firstly policies that facilitate structural 
change by overcoming information, co-ordination and externality challenges, and secondly 
policies that protect some selected firms and industries that defy comparative advantage, as 
determined by the existing endowment structure. Lin favours the former, and is very critical 
of the latter, in a sense making a case for industrial policy that is in line with the Ricardian 
trade theory discussed above.  
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Fine and Rustomjee (1997) outline the particular experience of state-led industrialisation in 
South Africa’s economic history. It is an industrial strategy, captured in the term the 
minerals-energy complex (MEC), and built around an import substituting model. This 
industrialisation effort, particularly during the Apartheid years, was characterised by heavy 
tariffs, preferential purchasing and the creation and backing of ‘national winners’, who in 
many instances comprised of state owned enterprises (SOEs) (Barnes, Kaplinsky and Morris, 
2003). The South African experience of industrialisation in the post-war period, rather than 
being marked by a shift from primary economic activity to secondary manufacturing, has 
been about the creation of a state sector around heavy industry, rather than being linked to a 
strategy of diversification away from primary activity in mining and agriculture. This 
analysis of industrialisation contends that South African industrial progress in most of the 
20th century has not signalled a departure from, but active and supplementary support of, the 
economy’s primary extractive sectors in particular.  
Deindustrialisation refers to declines in the share of manufacturing in employment and 
output. This is depicted graphically in Figure 1.1 which illustrates the South African 
situation between 2002 and 2011. Tregenna (2011) analyses the question of 
deindustrialisation by decomposing changes in the level and share of manufacturing 
employment. The results of the study indicate, that in most developed countries a decline in 
manufacturing employment is normally associated with rising productivity 
Deindustrialisation usually occurs at higher per capita incomes as the surplus labour from 
manufacturing is absorbed into the services industry. Tregenna then argues that 
deindustrialisation in developing countries like South Africa is premature as it occurs at low 
per capita incomes. Moreover, in line with earlier thinking, Tregenna argues that these 
decreases in manufacturing are as a result of a decline in overall capital formation, of which 
manufacturing expenditure accounts for a significant portion (Tregenna, 2011). Beyond being 
a problem of anaemic levels of investment, Tregenna points to the fact that deindustrialisation 
in developing countries is a problem associated with policy shifts towards trade and financial 
liberalisation rather than the maturation of their economic or productive structures. As a 
result of these challenges, it becomes difficult for local manufacturers to build up lost 
production capability because of the following micro-level factors inter alia;  
- Loss of market share  
- Fixed capital  
A Political Economy Review of the Transnet Freight Rail Competitive Supplier Development 
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- Loss of networks in input sourcing and output markets  
- Skills  
- Tacit knowledge and other institutional qualities that are built over time (Tregenna, 
2011).  
Alice Amsden also notes that domestic efforts aimed at industrialisation or reindustrialisation 
need to focus on transforming formally acquired knowledge into tacit knowledge through, 
‘learning by doing’ as opposed to a theoretical understanding of how industrial capabilities 
can be improved (Amsden, 2001). This however, becomes difficult in a context where such 
capabilities have been lost, or need to be acquired from scratch, and the state is required to 
facilitate such learning by providing the enabling conditions for this to occur.  
Difficulties emerge, in an international market structure that has been dominated by low-cost 
producers in labour intensive sectors, making re-entry or re-industrialisation difficult 
(Tregenna, 2011). Policy intervention may be able to reverse premature deindustrialisation, 
and if developing countries wish to pursue industrialisation in the 21st century, it cannot be 
business as usual, and targeted and effective industrial policies are required to stem the 
further decline of local industry.    
State-led development: The particular role of state owned enterprises.  
The first theoretical contribution outlining the rationale for the existence of any kind of firm, 
both public and private, came from Ronald Coase’s seminal 1937 contribution, The Nature of 
the Firm. In it Coase poses two important questions; why and under what conditions do firms 
emerge. Conventional economic theory suggests that, under efficient market conditions, 
economic agents will find it easier to contract for the goods and services they need with price 
as the co-ordinating mechanism, as opposed to setting up a hierarchical co-ordinating 
structure for contracting and exchange purposes. Coase argues that there is a cost to using the 
price mechanism. More succinctly, Coase argues that there are costs to transacting which are 
not factored into the market price of goods and services, such as search and information 
costs, bargaining and decision costs and policing and enforcement costs (Coase, 1937). These 
costs which are not included in the price, may lead to the under-provision of goods and 
services at market prices, and ultimately market failure. Firms then emerge, with 
entrepreneurs or government (in the case of public entities) playing a co-ordinating influence, 
and reducing transaction costs.  
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In particular, as it relates to state owned enterprises as firm structures, Ha Joon Chang (2007) 
provides a summary of the theoretical justifications for the emergence of state owned firms. 
Chang argues that there are three main reasons for the creation of state owned enterprises; 
natural monopoly, capital market failure, externalities and equity considerations.  
Firstly, a natural monopoly occurs in an industry where it is most efficient (involving the 
lowest long run average cost) for production to be concentrated in a single firm. This tends to 
be the case in industries where capital costs are a significant component of initial start-up 
costs. This creates large economies of scale in relation to the size of the market, creating 
significant barriers to entry for potential market entrants 
 
Secondly, in capital markets private sector investors may be reluctant to invest in industries 
with high risk and long term structures to realise the return on the investment. As a result, 
sectors such as rolling stock, would suffer from under-investment if capital markets were the 
only means to finance capital investment. 
 
Thirdly, private sector investors are not incentivised to invest in industries where the 
investment confers benefits on other parties free of charge. This is the commonly known, 
‘free-rider’ problem in economics. Infrastructure, as a public good, faces the ‘free-rider’ 
problem, and as such it is more optimal for the state, or institutions under it, to provide such 
infrastructure.  
 
Lastly, conventional investors and firms, driven by the profit motive, in sectors that provide 
basic goods and services may refuse to serve less profitable clients or customer segments, 
such as the poor, or people living in remote areas. Moreover, the free market, as something 
that has become a somewhat ahistorical construct, may fail to take into account historical 
inequities and disparities in access to power, wealth and income. Public policy then needs to 
take into account such historical inheritances, with the aim to redress some of these historical 
wrongs.  
 
Public Procurement as an Industrial Policy instrument  
Industrial policy according to Chang is policy pursued by the state, and/or its institutions with 
the aim of positively affecting the performance of industry (Chang H.-J. , 1998). Industrial 
A Political Economy Review of the Transnet Freight Rail Competitive Supplier Development 
Programme.  
 
17 
 
policy is commonly divided into three categories in the literature; horizontal policies which 
influence each industry, vertical policies that target specific sectors and the structural, which 
are aimed at promoting a structural shift in economic activity (Fine B. , 1997). The use of 
procurement to alter economic relations can be seen as a structural policy intervention in two 
ways. Firstly, in the sense that it aims to alter the South African industrial landscape through 
institutionally mediated actions aimed at improving the competitiveness and overall 
performance of local industry. Evans, quoted in Kattel and Lember (2010), seems to hold a 
similar view when he argues that, ‘if developing countries used public procurement only for 
increasing cost-effectiveness through the creation of a level playing field, these countries 
would voluntarily give up on using one of the most powerful demand-side innovation policy 
tools to promote innovation, industrial development, competitiveness and economic growth’ 
(Kattel & Lember, 2010, p. 386).  
Moreover, the point of articulating public procurement as part of an industrial policy lies in, 
as Lee notes, ‘providing new conditions for capital accumulation by readjusting economic 
relations’ (Lee, 2013, p. 63) Secondly, readjustment of economic relations through industrial 
policy in South Africa occurs amidst much discussion on fashioning the South African state 
as a ‘developmental state’. The notion of a developmental state refers to the phenomenon of 
state-led industrialisation that characterised the 20th century East Asian development 
experience. Freund(2006) drawing on the work of Evans(1995) argues that the model 
developmental state is one where bureaucratic apparatuses are embedded in social ties that 
bind the state to other non-state societal actors and provides institutionalised channels for the 
negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies (Freund, 2006 ). Therefore the use of 
procurement as industrial policy aimed at improving local manufacturing capabilities needs 
to be assessed on the basis of the social ties it engenders between the state and local suppliers 
and the institutional mechanisms that mediate this relationship in pursuit of commonly 
defined goals and policies.  
An inquiry of this kind would never be complete without understanding the particular 
interests and forces that are to emerge from the process. Lee argues that, ‘the way in which 
underlying economic agents with different economic interests are linked to each other needs 
to be at the heart of any analysis of industrial policy’ (Lee, 2013, p. 63). In particular, as it 
relates to procurement, there is a need to analyse the relations between different political and 
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economic interests that stand to have their conditions of accumulation altered by the 
purchasing decisions of state owned enterprises.  
Policy Governance: Rent management and economic development.  
Khan defines an economic rent as excess incomes which should not occur in the presence of 
efficient markets (Khan M. , 2000).The treatment of rents in the neoclassical literature 
suggests that state policy-induced rents may create incentives to direct resources away from 
more useful and socially beneficial uses towards rent-seeking behaviour in pursuit of excess 
returns. Many scholars have identified rents as non-compensated transfers, between different 
economic agents, facilitated by access to political power (Krueger 1974, Buchanan 1983).     
Krueger (1974) developed a model of competitive rent-seeking in a case where rents 
originate from quantitative restrictions on trade, such as embargoes, quotas and restrictive 
licensing. These restrictions on economic activity give rise to various forms of rents and 
people then compete for these rents. Competitive rent-seeking in this analysis, results in 
divergence between private and social costs of certain economic activities (Krueger, 1974). 
Buchanan (1983) arguing from the same intellectual tradition, observes that inefficiencies 
emerge from non-compensated transfers of valued rights and privileges among certain 
groups. Buchanan argued that rents and rent-seeking behaviour erode economic value. 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that rent-seeking exhibits two features which 
makes it detrimental to growth and economic development. Firstly, rent-seeking behaviour 
exhibits increasing returns, in the sense that an increase in rent-seeking behaviour leads to 
more rent-seeking relative to productive activity. Secondly, rent-seeking is likely to hurt 
innovative activities, and since innovation drives development (see Schumpeter 1934), then 
rent-seeking is harmful for development (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993 ).  
At the edges of the neoclassical tradition, North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) argue that 
conventional rent-seeking models fail because they posit the existence of a ‘normal’ stable 
state as a given in the development process. These models fail to explain the state, how it 
gains instruments of coercion, how it survives and how it enforces decisions particularly the 
rights and privileges extended to various groups in society (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 
2006). North et al. argue that the state’s foremost task is ensuring its own survival, and thus 
its activities will be aimed at establishing its power over society and the provision of rents 
and public goods. A natural state according to North et al. is a specific way of organising 
political and economic systems, such that economic rents created by limited entry are 
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available to secure commitments to stability and peace from politically powerful groups. 
Potential political rivals in a natural state will have a disincentive to fight when their 
economic rents are dependent on the existence of the state and social order. In a sense, this 
kind of analysis, posits that rents in limited entry societies (most developing countries) serve 
the function of ensuring stability and peace. As a result they can lead to development if they 
entrench peace, stability and the necessary conditions required for accumulation.  
A distinction is made in the literature, by Khan and others, between inefficient growth-
retarding and productive, ‘learning’ rents. As Khan argues there may be scope for certain 
kinds of rents to play an essential role in growth and development. As Khan observes, ‘The 
identification of some rents as efficient challenges the policy rule-of-thumb of the liberal 
market model which says that the removal of institutions and rights which protect rents is 
always desirable’ (Khan M. , 2000, p. 1). To accelerate industrial and technological learning, 
conditional policy-induced rents may be created to allow producers in the learning sectors to 
catch up and become globally competitive (Khan M. , 2000). This is an argument which is 
different to an analysis that assumes all rents are bad and that policy should be geared 
towards their eradication.  
Industrial Upgrading and Learning.  
There is an important link between the learning described by Khan(2010) and the upgrading 
of industrial capabilities. Industrial upgrading refers to how firms advance their position 
through the different stages of the global value chain towards participating in higher value 
adding activities. If we accept that the key to competitiveness is the success of the learning 
process where industry is able to use the latest technology efficiently to increase productivity 
and achieve the cost advantages associated with economies of scale, then the process of 
industrial upgrading is intimately tied to the learning process. Khan (2010) argues that the 
process of upgrading involves three related issues. Firstly the achievement of minimum 
quality that allows entry into globally competitive production for a variety of products. 
Secondly investments in manufacturing and productive capabilities and spreading these 
across the working population and lastly moving up the quality ladder in terms of a firm’s 
product offering (Khan M. , 2010) 
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Governance Agencies, Firm Structures and Political Settlements.  
Khan argues that old import-substitution inspired industrial policies failed because they could 
not ensure effort, and that the effectiveness of industrial policy interventions rests on a range 
of institutionally defined variables. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these interventions 
depends on the ‘interaction and appropriateness of three other sets of variables; the 
governance agencies implicitly responsible for enforcing the terms of the instrument, the firm 
structures describing the internal hierarchies of firms, their relationship with the state and the 
markets they operate in and the broadly defined political settlement that describes the 
relevant distribution of power between different agents involved in the learning and financing 
process’ (Khan M. , 2010, p. 1). Moreover Khan defines governance agencies as important 
tools of enforcing the obligations placed on different actors by a policy instrument. This 
presupposes, for the purposes of effective policy implementation, that these agencies will 
have the capacity to monitor and enforce agreed upon obligations, and expectations. 
Furthermore, the analysis argues that some kind of relationship should exist between the 
governance agencies, and powerful commercial and political interests that stand to gain from 
policy.  
In terms of firm structures, Khan argues that the degree to which learning and effort will 
occur depends on the internal organisation of firms and the structure of the market these firms 
operate in (Khan M. , 2010). What also becomes important, particularly in the South African 
case, is the structure of the historical and present relationship between firms targeted through 
policy and the existing government.  
With regard to the political settlements, Khan argues that the distribution of organisational 
and bargaining power between different social groups in society, is important to the effective 
implementation of industrial policy. Moreover, in the South African context, the distribution 
and dynamics of power within the ruling coalition become very important, as will be shown 
in the study (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2006). .  
1.3 Gaps in the Literature  
The global economy, post the 2007-8 financial crisis, is certainly a different place, insofar as 
thinking around economic policy and the role and character of the state, and how it intervenes 
in the economy. The need for industrialisation in developing economies like South Africa 
goes without saying. Faced with unemployment at crisis levels, the state has had to intervene 
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decisively, or at least draft policy that makes provision for such. This has only been possible, 
as a result of a global economy that is more receptive to state intervention in the economy. 
The study, presents interesting insights into how the state uses instruments, such as policy, at 
its disposal to effect meaningful socio-economic change.  
Having analysed the role of a state in pursuit of a Rosenstein-Rodan inspired ‘Big Push’, the 
management of relevant rents and of the relationships that underlie a policy instrument, 
becomes important. To outline the nature of the state’s role in altering relations in the 
marketplace in favour of particular, often patriotic, outcomes is one of the main aims of this 
study. How the state structures and manages the relationships lies at the core of the CSDP as 
a policy instrument, and will have an impact on its developmental outcomes, or lack thereof.  
Institutions are there to serve certain societal needs and concerns, the review of the literature 
for instance, outlined the needs and concerns that led to the emergence of state owned 
enterprises as a specific form of enterprise or commercial entity. The study needs to analyse 
in the South African context the added political economy needs and concerns that give rise to 
an instrument such as the CSDP. One may argue that these needs and concerns are the 
deindustrialisation that South Africa has experienced, and its attendant job losses, the 
destruction of industrial capabilities and the outdated and dysfunctional rail infrastructure in 
South Africa and the need to transform the racial profile of the industrial classes in South 
Africa, and create new interests in the previously disadvantaged segments of South African 
society. The latter has brought about a need for investment, and the former raises the concern 
of how policy can be geared towards leveraging investment for reindustrialisation and 
ultimately domestic economic development. In this context, this study fills an important gap 
in the literature in how the state intervenes using procurement and capital spending in pursuit 
of development, its role and the nature of its involvement.  
These are concerns which are not unique to South Africa, but however they have an 
important bearing on whether the South African state is able to use large capital spending on 
infrastructure to effect socio-economic changes in the form of employment, and the 
development of local enterprises. 
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1.4 Research Method and Summary of Empirical Work.  
The study employed an inductive qualitative method. The primary research was conducted 
through semi-structured interviews with personnel in the relevant and affected institutions. 
The people interviewed were the following; 
- Dr Edwin Ritchken, Advisor: Special Projects, Department of Public Enterprises  
- Steve Jardine, Chief Executive Officer, Sustainium Growth and Transformation 
Services and,  
- Garry Pita, Executive, Supplier Development, Transnet Group.  
The study also consulted different secondary data sources, such as news reports, interviews, 
research reports, academic papers and other relevant data sources. The study analysed the 
insights gained from the different data sources, through the framework proposed by 
Khan(2008), which argues that successful and enabling industrial policy, rests on the 
interaction of governance agencies, firm structures and political settlements in a given and 
specific country context. The study employs this framework in analysing the data sources, 
and also in providing recommendations in the concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
TRANSNET AND THE COMPETITIVE SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME (CSDP).  
2.1 A Brief History of Transnet Freight Rail  
The origins of the company now known as Transnet SOC Ltd can be traced back to 1853, 
when the Cape Town Railway and Dock Company was formed (Transnet, 2009). Five years 
later, the building of the first railway started through the signing of an agreement between the 
Cape Town Railway and Dock Company and the Government of the Cape of Good Hope. 
The railway network expanded quickly, catalysed by the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley 
in 1866, such that by 1910 the year the Union of South Africa was formed, the different 
railway authorities under the erstwhile governments of Natal, Transvaal and the Cape, came 
together to form the South African Railways and Harbours (SAR&H) (Transnet, 2009). By 
1930 the SAR&H had opened up at network of mainline passenger and freight rail services.  
In 1981 the government decided to restructure SAR&H into distinct business lines, and this 
process ultimately led to SAR&H becoming a state enterprise known as the South African 
Transport Services (SATS). Less than ten years later, on 1 April 1990 SATS was 
incorporated as Transnet Ltd with the government as the sole shareholder (Transnet, 2009). 
Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) then went on to become one of the major and more prominent 
divisions of Transnet. In 1997 Transnet transferred its rail commuter assets into a division 
known as MetroRail. In its current form, Transnet has the following divisions;  
- Transnet National Ports Authority  
- Transnet Port Terminals  
- Transnet Engineering  
- Transnet Pipelines  
- Transnet Freight Rail 
Transnet Freight Rail as the largest division within Transnet now operates three major freight 
divisions namely its General Freight Business (GFB), Orex and its COALink. TFR also 
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manages the mainline passenger services (known as ‘Shosholoza Meyl’) and the luxury Blue 
Train (Transnet, 2009). TFR fashions itself as a world class heavy haul freight business. Its 
core business is in providing freight logistics solutions for customers in the mining sector and 
in heavy and light manufacturing. TFR’s fleet provides logistic support in the automotive, 
agriculture, energy, chemicals and metals sectors inter alia.  
The division enjoys an extensive rail network across South Africa, which is linked to other 
rail networks in Sub Saharan Africa. Moreover, TFR’s footprint on the continent is immense, 
and its infrastructure represents 80% of Africa’s entire rail infrastructure (Transnet, 2009). In 
the medium to long term, TFR has outlined its strategic intent, which will guide its operations 
going forward, as the following;  
- Enabling economic growth  
- Facilitating trade growth by improving South Africa’s competitiveness in its tradable 
sectors  
- Reducing the cost of doing business by transferring traffic from road to rail and,  
- Skills development.  
The areas outlined in TFR’s strategic intent are an indication of some of the economic 
challenges that the company aims to address, and also an indication of some of the political 
economy issues that have plagued the rail sector over the past 25 years. Two related issues 
are of particular interest and deserve mention. Firstly there have been significantly low levels 
of fixed investment in the South African economy over this period, and this has been one of 
the causes of the low levels of economic growth the country has experienced over a long 
period. Transnet therefore sees itself, through its investment activity and operations, 
contributing to economic growth and stemming this trend of low investment. Secondly, if one 
looks at Figure 2.1 then we get an indication, when we compare it to Figure 2.2 that even in 
periods of relatively strong economic growth, there hasn’t been a concomitant rise in fixed 
capital formation.  
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Figure 2.1 South African Capital Formation as a component of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) 1988-2011.  
 
(Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts Data, 2013).  
Transnet Freight Rail, as a business whose main operations include a coal and iron-ore export 
line, has missed out on the resource boom of the early 2000s, as a result of ageing assets and 
operational inefficiencies associated with such an old fleet. These two issues point towards 
the urgency with which Transnet has had to commit capital, towards the renewal of their 
rolling stock. From the 2005/6 to the 2008/9 financial year, Transnet spent R53, 4 billion 
towards capital investment, and this jumped to an expected 80, 5 billion between 2009/10 and 
2013/4, 32 % of which will go to rolling stock (Transnet, 2009). These massive surges in 
capital investment indicate the urgency with which Transnet aims to remedy the close to three 
decades of underinvestment that have been a focal part of the state-owned enterprises’ recent 
past.  
Transnet has committed, as part of its market demand strategy (MDS), to an investment of 
R300 billion, to ensure that they increase cargo volumes from 200 million to 350 million tons 
by 2019. Almost 70% of the approved capital expenditure will go to Transnet Freight Rail, 
for the expansion of rail infrastructure, which includes rolling stock (Transnet, 2009). The 
1064 locomotives in question form part of this expenditure. More importantly this 
expenditure, through the leveraging of the large procurement that forms part of it, aims to 
build manufacturing capabilities in the local supplier industry. In large part due to the 
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underinvestment outlined above, many suppliers to the rail industry have lost key 
manufacturing capabilities.  
 
Figure 2.2 South African GDP growth rates between 1988 and 2011 
 
(Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, 2012).  
The competitive supplier development programme (CSDP) is seen as an important part of 
how Transnet aims to leverage this intended large capital spending for the benefit of the 
country. The socio-economic multipliers of this spending, in the form of export capabilities 
for suppliers, employment and improving South Africa’s industrial base are what the CSDP 
aims to realise (Transnet, 2008). Moreover the CSDP also aims to reduce the capital leakage 
associated with large scale infrastructure spending through building competitive and 
sustainable local supplier industries.  
2.2  Supplier Development: From NIPP to CSDP   
The origins of the competitive supplier development programme (CSDP) can be traced back 
to the cabinet adoption of the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) in January 2007. 
The NIPF outlined the government’s approach to industrial policy, and was followed, in the 
same spirit, by the respective iterations of the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). The IPAP 
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consists of direct and transversal interventions aimed at improving the competitiveness of the 
local industrial sector. The IPAP identifies the following as the key structural challenges 
facing the South African economy;  
- Imbalances in South Africa’s current growth path  
- Declining share of manufacturing in the country’s output  
- Unemployment  
- Low relative profitability of manufacturing  
- Cost and allocation of capital  
- Failure to leverage procurement (Transnet, 2009) 
The last challenge, directly relates to the intended use of supplier development provisions in 
state owned enterprise (SOE) procurement. The IPAP outlines key sectors for support that 
directly affect Transnet, namely; capital equipment and component manufacturing. Seen from 
this perspective, the CSDP is an important part of the government’s efforts at industrialising 
the South African economy (Transnet, 2008). The CSDP replaced the National Industrial 
Participation Programme (NIPP), which was an import offset programme run by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Figure 2.1 illustrates the shift from the NIPP to the 
CSDP. Under NIPP programme, all imports greater than US $10 million, the supplier would 
have to work with the DTI to invest the equivalent of 30% of the import value in a non-
related industry (Mohamed, Gwanoya, & Mfongeh, 2010).  
The DPE received cabinet approval for the CSDP in 2007. The CSDP sought to develop a 
system where foreign OEMs that win contracts to build major infrastructure on behalf of the 
government and its institutions, would be required to have a significant amount of local 
content. As part of this programme, SOEs had to submit their CSDP plans to support local 
second and third tier suppliers, to the DPE (Mohamed, Gwanoya, & Mfongeh, 2010).The 
Department of Public Enterprises(DPE) as the state institution that established the CSDP, 
envisaged that the program would, ‘involve procuring in such a way as to increase the 
competitiveness, capacity and capability of the local supply base, where there are 
comparative advantages and potential competitive advantages of local supply’ (Transnet, 
2008, p. 6). Then Transnet Group Chief Executive, Maria Ramos formally approached the 
DPE, notifying the Department that the state owned enterprise wished to participate in the 
CSDP, which meant that Transnet suppliers of imported manufactured goods and services 
were no longer required to be part of the NIPP.  
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Figure 2.3 NIPP to the CSDP.  
 
(Source: Transnet 2012).  
The CSDP involved both supply and demand-side measures. On the demand side, the DPE 
which initiated the CSDP is responsible for approving the supplier development plans of state 
owned enterprises, and on the supply-side the DTI provides incentives and support for the 
local supplier base, and the Department of Science and Technology (DST) aims to close any 
technological and specification gaps that may exist (Transnet, 2009). A distinction needs to 
be made between the CSDP and Transnet’s enterprise development initiatives as art of their 
supplier development Centre of Excellence (COE) and the CSDP. The focus of enterprise 
development is on investing resources into small micro and new suppliers who currently, or 
through extensive development, provide goods and services to Transnet. The CSDP, on the 
other hand, involves the localisation of Transnet’s supply chain through encouraging foreign 
direct investment from international suppliers into local businesses so that these firms can 
expand their capacity to not only supply the state owned entity’s supply chain, but also export 
as well (Transnet, 2009). Moreover, the latter programme uses government’s procurement 
spend to indirectly influence the development of competitive local suppliers.  
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The shift from the NIPP to the CSDP had important implications for Transnet’s business 
model. Firstly it meant that instead of investment in non-related industry to offset 
manufactured imports as was the case in the NIPP, the introduction of the CSDP involved a 
shift in focus towards the enterprises whose viability and longevity is directly determined by 
the demand and investment behaviour of Transnet and its suppliers. Secondly one of the 
overarching aims of the CSDP was to improve the profitability of the SOE as a result of cost-
savings from sourcing from innovative, responsive and more-competitive suppliers (Transnet, 
2008). This coupled with improved lead times would see an improvement in the cost 
structure of Transnet. Thirdly procuring capital goods and related manufactures from the 
domestic market would ensure that Transnet and its preferred suppliers in many instances 
would effectively protect themselves from adverse exchange rate fluctuations which could 
lead to cost and time overruns. All these benefits, added to increased employment and output, 
would bode well for the socio-economic contribution that state owned enterprises are 
expected to make in South Africa.  
2.2 The South African supplier industry 
As this study directly focuses on TFR and the procurement of 1064 locomotives, which has 
come to be known as the ‘ten sixty four’ contract,  the discussion on the local supplier 
industry, and its state, will focus on suppliers in one particular area of Transnet’s operations; 
rolling stock.  Suppliers in the rolling stock industries consist of tier-1, tier-2 and tier-3 
suppliers. Tier-1 suppliers are those who manufacture wagons, and are direct suppliers of ‘fit-
for-purpose’ equipment (systems and subsystems) (Transnet, 2009). The biggest tier-1 
supplier is Transnet Rail Engineering (TRE), which is responsible for the manufacture and 
repair of rolling stock. Other tier-1 suppliers, most of which are multinationals are; General 
Electric (GE), General Motors (GM), Alstom, EMD, Mitsui and Siemens.  
Tier-2 suppliers are manufacturers of assemblies and sub-assemblies or key maintenance and 
testing services. Companies that fall under this category include; Union Carriage and Wagon, 
Siemens, DCD-Dorbyl (whose subsidiaries include the rolling stock divisions of Metpro and 
Ringrollers), Scaw metals and Surtees (Transnet, 2009). All of these firms, except for Metpro 
which is based in Rosslyn, Pretoria, are located in Gauteng’s East Rand. Tier-3 suppliers 
provide components for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) such as the tier-1 firms 
mentioned above. However, it is important to note, that Transnet’s tier-3 suppliers, are tier-2 
suppliers to the OEMs. Therefore, the CSDP will be implemented, through a direct 
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contractual relationship with multinational OEMs (Transnet’s first tier suppliers), who as part 
of the bidding process, will have provided localisation and supplier development plans. These 
OEMs will be accepting contractual localisation obligations to extend their supply chains to 
local suppliers in South Africa (Transnet, 2008). These OEMs will then retain control and 
management over their supply chains, both locally and internationally. Thus, Transnet’s tier-2 
assemblers and sub-assemblers, become tier 1 suppliers to the OEMs. It is clear, from Figure 
2.4 that there has been a significant decline in output, and thus employment, in the local 
supplier industry over the past four decades. The illustration, by depicting the rail units built 
and refurbished by one of the local suppliers, Union Carriage and Wagon, indicates the need 
for investment to re-energise this industrial sector. 
Furthermore, Transnet, provides enterprise development and preferential procurement 
support to bolster local supplier relationships. Transnet, having struck the CSDP agreement 
with the OEM as its tier-1 supplier, then provides support to the OEM’s tier-1 and tier-2 
suppliers, which are engaged in the manufacture of subassemblies and components for the 
OEMs respectively (Transnet, 2008). Transnet’s CSDP strategic approach is to engage tier-1 
suppliers, and to influence them to engage tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers. Figure 3.2 indicates 
how Transnet’s approach is envisaged to work. This process starts from when the request for 
proposals begins in the bidding process, and continues with Transnet lobbying the OEM’s 
buyers to promote local suppliers as an attractive alternative source of supply, and advising 
OEM’s, interestingly, on the suitability of TRE(Transnet Rail Engineering) and other local 
suppliers as  manufacturers of rolling stock components 
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Figure 2.4 Union Carriage and Wagon (UCW) Production 1960-2012.  
 
(Source: Union Carriage and Wagon Company Profile, 2013).  
.  
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Figure 2.5 The CSDP strategic approach.  
 
  
The conflict and delays over evaluation criteria, not only point to a breakdown in this 
institutionally mediated interaction model, but also indicates a fundamental divergence of 
views about how to achieve industrialisation and economic growth. The following chapter 
discusses some of the legislation and policy on public procurement, which to a large extent, 
lies at the centre of the differences between the different state institutions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK ON PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT.  
3.1 Procurement as a system  
Watermeyer (2011) defines a system as ‘an established way of doing things and provides 
order and a platform for the methodical planning of a way of proceeding’ (p.1). Systems are 
underpinned by processes, procedures and methods. Processes are a logically related set of 
actions carried out in a manner that leads to the completion of a major deliverable or the 
achievement of a particular milestone (Watermeyer, 2011). Procedures refer the formal steps 
that need to be taken in the performance of a certain task, and methods are a collection of 
rules that are documented and ordered in a systematic manner. Procurement procedures, as 
important as they may be, do not adequately allow one to problematize the location of state 
purchasing decisions as an instrument that seeks to deal with social and economic realities 
and exigencies. As Mohamed and Gwanoya et al note;  
‘Procurement is much more than a process or procedure. It is a fundamental and integrated part of the 
governance and public financial management system’ (Mohamed, Gwanoya, & Mfongeh, 2010, p. 5) 
Viewing procurement as an integral part of a governance system allows us to analyse it in its 
totality, and view its constituent elements through the prism of the governance agencies, firm 
structures and political settlements nexus outlined above, and the interaction between these 
elements. The importance of procurement as a system tends to be obscured by the fact that it 
happens in a decentralised fashion across the state. Although the state in its entirety is not the 
focus of this study, however procurement as viewed in the public discourse contributes to our 
day-to-day understanding of government purchasing and its potential or lack thereof as a tool 
of social and economic reform. The fragmented story of state purchasing indicates how the 
thinking aligned with New Public Management (NPM) school of thought has become 
commonplace in the discourses on the state in South Africa.  
In the 1990s public policy implementation became associated with decentralisation and 
market-like discipline, as exemplified by the New Public Management (NPM) reforms. The 
Apartheid government had historically been comfortable with state induced rents managed 
centrally through the Tender Boards, albeit for the exclusive benefit of the white minority. 
The reform of the public procurement system in the late 1990s and early 2000s, was shaped 
A Political Economy Review of the Transnet Freight Rail Competitive Supplier Development 
Programme.  
 
34 
 
by NPM values. These values are, inter alia, cost effectiveness, transparency and enhanced 
competition (Kattel & Lember, 2010). A major factor shaping this shift, was a sense that the 
Apartheid procurement system was a highly centralised, cumbersome, inefficient and a 
constraint to development. These are the NPM values that inform the PPFA, and its insistence 
on competitive bidding processes free of rent-seeking. The CSDP, in so far as it represents a 
shift away from these values, is a policy-induced rent, that aims to privilege local supplier 
concerns above any other supplier firms outside of South Africa. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
evaluation of the bidding process, taking into account the SOE’s CSDP.  
Figure 3.1 The evaluation of the bidding process. 
 
  
 
The figure illustrates the two evaluations that occur. The first evaluation focuses technical 
aspects and functionality of the tender bid. The second evaluation concerns supplier 
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development provisions, broad-based black economic empowerment (B-BEE) and price 
considerations. This is a departure from the normal procurement evaluation criteria, which 
have price and functionality as the overriding considerations.  
This departure presents interesting insights that challenge the conventional praxis of public 
procurement. As Dr Edwin Ritchken, Strategy Advisor at the DPE, pointed out, an 
assessment of the CSDP is an assessment of a new way of procuring. In a sense, the CSDP 
introduces the question of how change is managed within state institutions in order to build 
the capabilities required in a developmental agenda (Ritchken, 2013). With added evaluation 
objectives, management of key supply chain functions became more cumbersome. As Dr 
Ritchken pointed out, ‘The hardest part of the CSDP was in getting middle management to 
spiritually embrace something that made their work harder’ (Ritchken, 2013).  
The procedures and methods used to carry out public procurement, informed by policy and 
legislation, leading to the award of a contract to a preferred bidder need to be clearly defined, 
in order to establish the basis of the contract entered into with successful bidders. The 
procedures and methods, used to guide the procuring entity in implementing the procurement 
process are as important as what is being procured, particularly in a developing country 
context like South Africa, where these have to be constantly in conversation with the nation’s 
other social and economic policy considerations.  
 
3.2 The Legislative and Policy Framework  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) provides the fundamental 
framework outlining how public procurement should be carried out in South Africa. Section 
217 of the Constitution establishes the primary and secondary objectives of public 
procurement in South Africa. Table 3.1 depicts the primary and secondary objectives of 
public procurement as outlined in the Constitution.  
Objective  Reference  
Primary Procurement system needs to be fair, equitable, 
transparent, competitive and cost effective  
Section 
217(1) 
Secondary  Procurement policy may provide for: 
a) Categories of preference in the allocation of 
Section 
217(2) 
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contracts; and  
b) The protection or advancement of persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination 
(Source: Watermeyer, 2011) 
The Constitution makes the following provision; that national legislation must prescribe 
framework within which the objectives outlined in Section 217 can be implemented, in the 
form of a policy framework. The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 2000(Act 
5 of 2000), known as the ‘PPPFA’ from here onwards was promulgated in response to this 
constitutional imperative.  
The main aim of the act was to ensure the participation of historically disadvantaged 
individuals (HDIs) and small medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs). The legislation makes 
provision in Section 2(1) for organs of state to implement a preferential procurement policy 
that favours the groups mentioned above (Mohamed, Gwanoya, & Mfongeh, 2010). The 
Preferential Procurement Regulations were then promulgated in 2001 following the passing 
of the act in 2000, to give effect to the provisions of the Act. The bid evaluation system 
envisaged in the regulations aims to preference to all tenders to HDIs and SMMEs, but in 
addition awards points for inter alia;  
 The promotion of  South African owned enterprises 
 The promotion of export oriented production to create jobs  
 The intensification of labour intensive production  (Mohamed, Gwanoya, & Mfongeh, 
2010) 
There is a ‘spanner in the works’ however, as SOEs, which are defined as organs of state by 
section 239 of the Constitution, are not regarded as organs of state for the purposes of the 
Act, and by extension the regulations. This means that they are not subject to the provisions 
outlined in the Act, however they remain under other legislation which assigns a fiscal 
oversight role to the National Treasury and the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The legislation, 
which we will concern ourselves with, which makes provision for this National Treasury 
oversight role is the Public Finance Management Act of 1999, known as the ‘PFMA’ 
hereafter.  
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4.3 The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and other oversight issues  
The PFMA regulates the financial management of national and provincial governments. 
However, it also recognises state owned commercial entities as outlined in s239 of the 
Constitution. Section 1 of the PFMA defines an SOE, which it refers to as a, ‘national 
government business enterprise’, to be an entity which;  
(a) Is a juristic person under the ownership and control of the national executive  
(b) Has been assigned financial and operational authority to carry on a business activity;  
(c) As its principal business, provides goods or services in accordance with ordinary 
business principles  
(d) Is financed fully or substantially from sources other than  
(i) The National Revenue Fund; or  
(ii) By way of a tax, levy or other statutory money (PRC, 2011).  
 
 The National Treasury, is assigned the oversight role over the PFMA as it applies to SOEs.  
 
4.4 Department of Trade and Industry Rolling Stock Designation  
The Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2011, pertaining to the PPPFA, make provision 
for the DTI to designate sectors in line with national development and industrial policies for 
local production (Treasury, 2012). Regulation 9(1) prescribes that in the award of bids where 
local production and content is of critical importance, such bids need to be advertised with a 
specific condition that only locally produced services, works or locally produced 
manufactures, with a stipulated minimum threshold for local content and production will be 
considered.  
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Figure 3.2 The  designation thresholds that the DTI has set for the rolling stock 
industry.  
 
(Source: National Treasury, 2012).  
In order to ensure that localisation will be achieved in the intended manufacturing activities, 
the following components, in Figure 3.3 have also been designated and need to be included 
in bid invitations and, as Garry Pita, Executive: Supplier Development at Transnet indicated, 
they also need to be clearly outlined in the request for proposal (RFP).  
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Figure 3.3 List of designated rolling stock components.  
(Source: National Treasury, 2012).  
4.5 National Treasury Instruction Notes on Rolling Stock Procurement 
The purpose of the Treasury’s instruction note is to regulate the environment within which 
accounting officers and accounting authorities may procure rail rolling stock, which has been 
designated for local production and content. The instruction note also serves to outline the 
evaluation process for rolling stock tender bids. A two stage process may be followed in 
evaluating the bids received for each contract.  
(i) Evaluation in terms of the stipulated minimum threshold for local content and 
production  
A bidder’s commitment to local content needs to be outlined in the Declaration Certificate for 
Local Content, which should accompany the relevant bid documents. The declaration made 
by the bidder in the declaration certificate needs to be in line with the designations set out by 
the DTI for the bid to be successful. Where the bid is for more than one product, local content 
percentages need to be outlined for each product (Treasury, 2012).  
Accounting officers and supply chain officials at the SOE need to ensure that the relevant 
documentation regarding local content is submitted as part of the bid documentation. A 
bidder who fails to do this may be disqualified from the tender process. Lastly, the DTI has a 
right, as and when it is necessary, to request auditors certificates indicating the authenticity of 
the local content declarations (Treasury, 2012).  
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(ii) Evaluation in terms of the 90/10 and 80/20 preference points systems.  
In the second stage of the evaluation process, only bids that have achieved the minimum 
threshold can be evaluated further. At this stage, the bids are evaluated according to the 80/20 
and 90/20 principle outlined in the Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2011. The 
evaluation criteria outlines that, for all contracts below R10 million the 80\20 rule is to be 
applied. For all contracts above R10 million, the 90\10 principle is applied. The evaluation 
criteria, according to the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA), provides 
a 90% weighting to price considerations and a 10% consideration to Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) and other social considerations like enterprise 
development, local supplier development, job creation and skills transfer (Treasury, 
2012).SOE accounting officers and authorities also need to ensure that procurement processes 
for rolling stock and related components take into account benchmark prices, value for 
money and economies of scale (Treasury, 2012).  
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY RESEARCH.  
This section aims to understand the insights gained from the semi-structured interviews with 
respondents, by looking at what new empirical and primary experiences, outside of the 
literature emerge. These insights will allow the study to add to the body of knowledge on the 
use of public procurement to achieve the aims of industrialising developing economies such 
as South Africa. This section is divided into three parts. The first part presents some initial 
research findings and primary insights. The second part deals with the concerns expressed by 
the local supplier industry, about the role of TRE in the CSDP. Thirdly a discussion is 
presented on the contestations within and outside the ruling coalition around how the ANC 
government fashions itself as a developmental state.  
4. 1 Research Findings and Primary Insights  
Transnet has managed to extract supplier development value through the Competitive 
Supplier Development Programme (CSDP) since 2008. The advent of the CSDP has placed 
contractual obligations on OEMs to develop the local supplier industry. The total contractual 
committed value has been in excess of R14 billion (Chokoe & Pita, 2013). Table 4.1 outlines 
some of the transactions and contractual agreements which are set to alter the conditions of 
accumulation for local suppliers. More importantly, the CSDP has sought to assist the growth 
of small supplier firms in areas that were historically dominated by a few white core 
suppliers. The answer to the above question needs to outline new areas of investment and the 
development of new productive capabilities where such didn’t exist, or where these had 
previously been underdeveloped. Contractually, General Electric, Gijima and EMD inter alia  
(see Table 5.1) have made investments or signalled commitments to invest in plant and 
equipment, local manufacturing, skills transfer and the procurement of local parts and 
components in order to fulfil their localisation obligations. 
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Table 4.1 A few successful CSDP transactions.  
 
 
(Source: Transnet, 2013)  
 
4.2. Tension between Transnet’s own manufacturing capability and other industry players 
 
It hasn’t been plain sailing, however, as far as the impact on the local supplier industry, of 
these investment commitments is concerned. Steve Jardine is the Chief Executive Officer 
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(CEO) of Sustainium Growth and Transformation Services. Sustainium offers industry 
clustering and supplier development facilitation services to SOEs, global OEMs and the local 
supplier industry. Mr Jardine has supply chain and leadership experience in the rail rolling 
stock and automotive sectors. Steve had the following to say, about the investment of global 
OEMs in the local supplier industry;  
 
‘In terms of the relationship between Transnet, the OEM and the local supplier industry, from 
a supplier perspective there are real concerns. When an OEM comes into the country they 
only have a discussion with Transnet Rail Engineering (in discharging their localisation 
initiatives) and no one else. The responsibility lies with the OEM to come and speak to the 
local industry’ (Jardine, 2013).   
 
Steve Jardine argued that local content designation and the investment obligations this places 
on successful bidders, will not have any force or effect to protect and develop the local 
supplier industry (Jardine, 2013). Jardine’s sentiments are largely supported by the concerns, 
shared by Edwin Ritchken as well, around the role of other Transnet Group subsidiaries in the 
CSDP, particularly Transnet Rail Engineering. The role of Transnet Rail Engineering is a 
somewhat uncertain one. As a commercial entity Transnet’s rail engineering business serves 
the same function as firms in the local supplier industry, but however it has a special role in 
that it is an integral part of the Transnet Group.  
 
Two of South Africa’s largest rail engineering firms, DCD Group and Union Carriage and 
Wagon, have raised concerns around the bias towards Transnet Rail Engineering in the award 
of contracts with global OEMs and public investments in plant upgrade (Smith, 2013 ). Both 
firms design and manufacture locomotives, wagons and coaches. They would be the typical 
kind of firms which would be intended to benefit from the Transnet supplier development 
programs. Global OEMs such as Alstom and General Electric, in their hopes to win tenders 
have been reluctant to contract, on a long term basis, with firms like DCD and without clarity 
on how much work would contractually be directed to Transnet Rail Engineering. The two 
firms have further argued that an impression has been created that all rolling stock would be 
manufactured within Transnet Rail Engineering’s control. One of the fault lines of the CSDP 
has been the inability of Transnet to clarify, at a supplier development policy level, the extent 
to which the private sector would be allowed to compete with Transnet Rail Engineering, in 
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light of some of the public investments which are being made in Transnet Freight Rail’s sister 
company.  
 
Rob King, Managing Director of DCD had this to say about the concerns of an inherent bias 
in the award of business in favour of Transnet Rail Engineering;  
 
‘What worries us in particular is that we have a supply chain in South Africa that may not be 
used in the tenders and it would seem there is new capacity being developed at Transnet Rail 
Engineering and I would question why we need that’ (Smith, 2013 ) 
 
DCD has been doing work with Eskom to supply local content to its build programme, this 
has included discussion on how DCD could participate in the planned nuclear power 
programme. This, Mr King argues, is at odds to the approach when it comes to rolling stock;  
 
‘It’s like the government is schizophrenic, when it comes to trains we do one thing and when 
we do energy we engage differently’ (Smith, 2013 ).  
 
Mr King also highlighted the ideological differences embedded within the state, in its pursuit 
of industrial development;  
 
‘It’s as if you have the National Development Plan going up against the developmental state. 
Up there are two different philosophies’ (Smith, 2013 ).  
 
DCD however, has made investments of its own, having launched the first R100m phase of a 
R240m investment to recapitalise its railway manufacturing plant in Boksburg on the 28th of 
November 2013. These investments, which introduce robotic technology aimed at boosting 
competitiveness, are set to expand  DCD’s rail manufacturing capacities ten-fold. In terms of 
job creation, DCD also committed to the creation of hundred new jobs by January 2014 
(Allix, 2013 ). DCD’s complaints about public investments in Transnet Rail Engineering 
reflect an important concern within the supplier industry about the future competitive 
environment within the rail industry. Is the CSDP set to boost Transnet Group’s internal 
capacity at the expense of improving the capacity and economies of scale for other private 
sector local suppliers? Steve Jardine seems to think so;  
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‘Transnet Rail Engineering, before the tender had already been announced, came out saying 
that they would be assembling the locomotives. With such an environment, as an OEM who 
has to engage the local industry, they have no incentive to speak to anybody else. (What 
about open tender?) What is the role of Transnet? If Transnet is going to do everything, what 
about the local suppliers?’ 
 
4.2.1 Issues around the competitive climate (or lack thereof) in the local supplier industry.  
 
Many in the local supplier industry in South Africa feel that public investments in internal 
capacity by Transnet may serve to give the SOE an unfair advantage, and local suppliers a 
disadvantage, in their relations with global rail manufacturers. Steve Jardine had this to say, 
of this perception;  
 
‘Transnet’s investments in plant upgrade are using public money to improve internal 
capacity in order to exclude, in future, private sector local suppliers .‘Why would I (as a 
global OEM) go and spend that money at UCW again?’ (Jardine, 2013).  
 
What simply was a question around the government’s policy interventions aimed at 
incentivising OEM investment in the local supplier industry, reveals important tensions 
between the private sector and the state, but also within the state, around how 
industrialisation should be pursued. Transnet has argued in the following manner, in defence 
of the role of TRE;  
‘It would be a critical error in judgment not to leverage Transnet’s current strength in 
maintenance and engineering. Transnet will need to place TRE at the centre of Transnet’s 
CSDP programme’ (Transnet, Transnet Supplier Development Plan , 2008, p. 46). 
 
This divergence in approach raises interesting questions and insights into the private-sector 
led vs. state-led development approaches, and the roles of an intervening state as opposed to 
an enabling regulatory state far removed from commercial activities of its own. 
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This mirrors, sentiments expressed by what Dr Edwin Ritchken termed, ‘a struggle for the 
soul of the state’, and this struggle is not waged by two distinct enemies, but is an ideological 
war contested around ideas of how to achieve industrialisation.  
As it relates to the latter, the state institutions in question, the DPE and Transnet, need to 
manage a complex set of relationships with global OEMs and local suppliers. Moreover, the 
state needs to manage its own internal constituent elements, its departments and commercial 
enterprises, in order to leverage procurement for local industrial development.  
4.3 Internal and external tensions around the developmental state  
South Africa and the ANC in particular, has since President Thabo Mbeki’s second term of 
office, and more emphatically since the Polokwane Conference in 2007 declared itself a 
developmental state. In the mould of the East Asian strong states, the South African 
government began to see its role as state that can facilitate the achievement of sustained 
economic growth, and maintain itself as a state on that basis. The central question then 
becomes; how does this self-styled developmental state manage its internal tensions, and 
external relationships fashioned by policy, to build industrial capability. Such industrial 
capability must be able to address urgent national concerns, such as unemployment and black 
economic empowerment.  
Fine (2010) rejects the developmental state paradigm on analytical grounds. Fine observes 
that the paradigm, by drawing a distinction between state and market, does not appropriately 
identify underlying political and economic interests and how these are represented through 
the state and the market (Fine B. , 2010).  Fine argues that for South African state, ‘far from 
being a developmental state co-ordinating or even coercing private capital to commit to a 
concerted programme of industrial expansion and diversification, the interests of private 
capital have predominated over developmental goals’ (Fine B. , 2010, p. 175). Fine further 
argues that an adherence, at a policy level to macroeconomic orthodoxy has prevailed at the 
expense of broader economic and social interventions. Even though, there has been strict 
following of orthodox macroeconomic principles by the state, there hasn’t been wholesale 
privatisation of state owned entities, as the logical conclusion would suggest. The reasons for 
this, highlight an important historical and contemporary role envisaged by the state for its 
commercial enterprises. How this role is managed, in conjunction with other tensions will 
influence the performance of the CSDP towards its intended objectives.  
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Southall (2007) argues that the state sector has historically enjoyed a symbiotic relationship 
with private capital, and by not privatising the parastatals totally, this reflected the ANC 
government’s, ‘reluctance to cede ownership of strategic assets to forces which might prove 
beyond its control’ (p. 204). Southall further argues that the ANC government’s policy 
towards state owned entities started out as leftist, went right, and then returned to centre, in 
its approach to state involvement in the economy. In addition, parastatals have always been  
central to class and ethnic mobilisation, and just as the National Party had used them to 
promote the development of Afrikaner capital around the MEC, and the ANC continues to 
see them as key instruments for black economic empowerment, as Mr Malusi Gigaba, 
Minister of Public Enterprises notes in relation to Transnet’s demand strategy;  
‘This presents an opportunity for black business to explore both downstream and upstream 
initiatives, high value-added goods and growth sectors in the infrastructure value chain like 
cement plants, stone mining and others’ 
(http://www.southafrica.info/business/trends/empowerment/infrastructure-240114.htm# - 
accessed 25 February 2014.)  
Southall argues that the government’s approach to parastatals and its policy in that regard, is 
predicated on the use of the state to promote black ownership and control of the economy 
(Southall, 2007 ). The CSDP as part of the policy frameworks aimed at achieving that 
overarching objective faces many tensions, and contestations. The two central tensions that 
emerge from this chapter are as follows;  
a) The tension and difficulty within the ANC of creating a black industrial class that can 
develop fast enough, to be able to benefit from urgently required infrastructure 
investment in South Africa. What would be termed, a patriotic or developmental 
national bourgeoisie reflected across both the state and the market.  
b) The tension around which interests’ state policy promotes, and the possibility of 
promoting established white interests in the rail sector, as opposed to creating new 
black industrial interests, through the CSDP and other industrial policy measures.  
These tensions, and many others, will be assessed in the following chapter using the 
governance agencies, firm structures and political settlement approach proposed by 
Khan(2010).   
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CHAPTER 5 
FURTHER INSIGHTS GAINED FROM RESEARCH FINDINGS  
 
5.1 Governance Agencies  
 
Lee (2013) argues that a successful industrial policy is defined by the extent to which it alters 
conditions of accumulation and the extent to which it enables new forms of accumulation to 
occur. Blankenburg and Khan (2009) raise the central concern that the 21st century conditions 
for industrial catch-up, learning and ultimately development, are different to those faced by 
earlier developers. Khan argues that, ‘non-market incentives are required for catching up, the 
effective implementation of such strategies typically also requires institutional systems of 
compulsion to supplement the discipline imposed by the market’ (Blankenburg & Khan, 
2009, p. 2). 
 
The mechanisms used in the CSDP require the co-ordination of different government 
departments, state owned enterprises and other private and public sector agencies. The co-
ordination of these different institutions, with different focuses and institutional thinking on 
development issues, represent what Khan and Blankenburg define as the compatibility (or 
lack thereof) between the institutional compulsions and the organization and structure of 
political power in any society. 
 
It is therefore important to analyse the governance agencies charged with managing a policy 
instrument such as the CSDP. Table 5.1 illustrates the internal stakeholders that need to be 
managed.  
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Table 5.1 Internal Stakeholder Management  
 
 
 
The table indicates the organisational support that a supplier development policy intervention 
such as the CSDP requires at executive committee, operations committee and chief 
procurement office level at all business units within the Transnet Group (Transnet, Transnet 
Supplier Development Plan , 2008). In terms of the external stakeholders which are integral 
to the success of the CSDP, there are a wide range of stakeholders which are involved in the 
management of the CSDP as a policy instrument. The Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI). From when the DPE introduced the CSDP in 2008, it facilitated consultation between; 
 Participating SOEs (including Transnet)  
 Government institutions (DTI, DST, CSIR and the IDC)  
 The local supplier industry represented by supplier industry associations  
These consultations where carried out in order to understand industry perspectives on areas of 
competitive advantages and possible productivity improvement (Transnet, Transnet Supplier 
Development Plan , 2008).  
The DPE in terms of the obligations placed by the CSDP is expected to fulfil the following 
roles. They are required to communicate successes of CSDP initiatives publicly and provide 
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assistance to participating SOEs as required, such as funding advice and access to 
benchmarking services (Transnet, Transnet Supplier Development Plan , 2008).  
Additionally, the DPE has to facilitate the Supplier Benchmarking Forum between SOEs, 
government institutions and UNIDO as the benchmarking service provider  and mprove 
stakeholder engagement models to reach more local SOE tier-2 and tier-3 
suppliers.Furthermore the DPE is expected to share the importance of a database of 
benchmarked tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers as a means for tendering global OEMs to propose 
participants for localising their supply chain (Transnet, Transnet Supplier Development Plan , 
2008).  
In essence, the envisaged role for the DPE in the CSDP is that of a co-ordinating and 
facilitating institution, as we shall see below, in practice this role is far less clear.  
The DTI has the following roles and expectations assigned to it as part of the CSDP;  
- Assist OEMs with registration and legal issues in setting up operations in South 
Africa  
- Assist OEMs with customs and duties for SOE mega project imports  
- Identify potential suppliers and industries based on DTI’s industry  
- Assist in leading and supporting trade delegations to OEM procurement personnel and 
lastly;  
- Facilitate access to DTI incentives and support measures for local SOE tier-2 and tier-
3 suppliers. (Transnet, Transnet Supplier Development Plan , 2008)  
The DST and the CSIR are required to assist suppliers needing Research and Development on 
new technologies or in teaming up with OEM technologies. In terms of financing, the IDC is 
expected to provide development funding options as required by OEMs, and/or tier-2 and 
tier-3 suppliers. They are also expected to provide advice and/or assistance to Transnet 
Supply Chain officials on business case development of CSDP opportunities and due 
diligence of local suppliers requesting admittance into the CSDP on a case-by-case basis. 
Additionally, the IDC is expected to provide access to their market research, industry 
information and the relevant industry statistics.  
Industry associations on the other hand, are expected to liase with supplier development 
managers with respect to market dynamics and the dissemination of information. They are 
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also expected to provide sector information and review and accept supplier development 
plans.  
5.2 Firm Structures  
The intended objectives of the CSDP, such as employment creation, increases in 
manufacturing value added and ultimately the creation of new conditions of accumulation can 
only be made possible if local suppliers are able to form part of global OEM supply chains 
and service these supply chains even beyond the Transnet capital spend. An analysis of the 
firm structures of the firms wishing to enter the global OEM value chains and the global 
OEM’s value chains themselves allows us to assess the possibility for local firms to enhance 
their position in global markets, one of the central aims of the CSDP.  
Gereffi et al argue that two important features of the contemporary global economy are the 
globalization of production and trade (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). According to 
Gereffi et al, this globalization has had the following effects; 
- Growth of industrial capabilities in developing countries  
- Vertical disintegration of transnational corporations which are redefining their core 
competencies to focus on innovation, product strategy, marketing and other highest 
value-added segments of manufacturing. This has occurred while these firms have 
reduced their direct investment and ownership of non-core activities such as generic 
services and volume production (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005, p. 79).  
An analysis of global value chains, and the effect of their configuration on local 
manufacturing capabilities is important for two different, but interrelated reasons. The first 
being, that the ways in which global production and distribution systems are integrated and 
secondly the possibilities for firms in developing countries to enhance their position in global 
markets (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). The latter directly responds to the intended 
outcome of the CSDP, however an analysis of the diverse firm structures that will be affected 
by the CSDP is important to understand the possibilities for the local supplier industry to 
enhance its position in the global rolling stock market.  
5.2.1 Challenges in the local supplier industry-global OEM nexus  
As the OEMs are charged with capacitating the local industry, as part of the CSDP, it is 
important that one analyses the connection, or lack thereof between the local supplier 
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industry, and global OEMs. Insights from the semi-structured interviews conducted indicate 
that the relationship is seen from different vantage points depending on which side one 
stands. The success of the CSDP is dependent on the functional interaction between the firm 
structures in the OEMs and the local supplier industry. Edwin Ritchken, Strategy Advisor at 
the DPE, alluded to how unresponsive the local supplier industry was, in the face of large 
demand from the SOE’s market demand strategy. This was a sentiment shared by 
independent development consultant, Greg Poisson argues that;  
'..while it seems that foreign OEMs have accepted government’s localisation initiatives and 
have competed to meet and exceed government requirements, the response from the local 
manufacturing sector, can at best be described as patchy’ (Poisson, 2013 ).  
Of the stakeholders one has spoken to, Steve Jardine shared the view together with Greg 
Poisson, that years of under-investment and uneven orders have led to a climate of 
uncertainty where local suppliers are afraid to commit any capital or other expenditure 
towards improving their productive capabilities. This has then left them in a state, where they 
are unable to respond to the conditions laid down by OEMs in their subcontracting requests 
(Jardine, 2013). 
Poisson further argues that the local supplier industry assumes that it has no role to play in 
supplier development initiatives and that the onus is on the OEMs to meet all regulatory 
obligations relating to localisation, and simply hand-deliver work packages to the local 
industry (Poisson, 2013 ). This view is refuted by what Steve Jardine stated as the cause of 
underinvestment by the local industry; uncertainty. Jardine argued that uncertainty about 
getting the OEM contracts, or being overlooked by OEMs or even by having the supplier 
contracts given to Transnet Rail Engineering, has made the local industry, save for the DCD’s 
of this world, quite nervous about investing in productive capacity in order to use large state 
spending in order to gain global competitiveness;  
‘In this environment, you don’t know who the winners are going to be, and because the 
industry doesn’t know who they are, they don’t invest in the right capacity’ (Jardine, 2013). 
It is however, notably interesting that the local supplier industry and the global OEMs are not 
as homogenous or uniform, in their responsiveness or lack thereof to regulatory change, or 
OEM subcontracting requests. Steve Jardine, in responding to an enquiry about the nature of 
the relationship between the local supplier industry and global OEMs, said that a number of 
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OEMs bidding for Transnet work, have gone into the local supplier industry to look for the 
capacity, and where they have found that capacity they have contracted with those suppliers 
(Jardine, 2013). The question then becomes, is that enough to ensure investment, and how 
much investment is needed to make the global industry globally competitive, and who will be 
expected to make this investment and under what conditions?  
One of the concerns expressed by the local industry, is the amount of time that the local 
industry has to make these investments and benefit from the spending, which has already 
come on board (Jardine, 2013). This mirrors, a similar concern, of how long it may take to 
build black industrialists, and whether or not these industrialists will be developed in time to 
benefit from the large capital spending.  As the Executive for Supplier Development at the 
Transnet Group, Garry Pita observed, that the local industry in terms of some of the high 
value elements of rail value chains, has very little capability beyond, ‘fabrication, metal 
bashing and taking designs from other overseas entities and then doing the assembly’ (Pita, 
2014). Unfortunately, assembly generally accounts for 15% at most of the total pricing of the 
final end product (Pita, 2014). This means that the current value addition that occurs in the 
local industry to rail products, is very low as a result of inadequate local capabilities, and this 
has meant that very few firms (especially of the smaller ones) have benefitted from large 
Transnet rolling stock contracts. This difficulty was also expressed by Dr Shawn 
Cunningham, a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Vaal University of Technology and a Research 
Associate at the Institute for Economic Research on Innovation at Tshwane University of 
Technology;  
‘Due to public procurement pressure, there simply is not enough time to develop local 
manufacturers. For this reason, a select group specialized and competent firms are being 
identified and drawn into local procurement initiatives, often giving up other business within 
local supply chains. Thus our local manufacturing sector is becoming more concentrated and 
more isolated from export markets to local markets’ (Cunningham, 2013)  
If the industry will become more concentrated as a result of local procurement initiatives, 
then the CSDP needs to ensure that its methodology at an SOE level is robust enough to 
ensure that public procurement is not only benefitting established industries alone, but also 
expanding emerging firms and developing new ones, in this way, the program will have 
addressed Lee’s need for industrial policy to create conditions for new forces of accumulation 
to occur.  
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The analysis above indicates one central and overriding concern; that our local manufacturing 
capabilities are typically insignificant relative to what we demand in terms of public 
infrastructure, and this then makes space for global OEMs to bid for public infrastructure 
spending. Supplier development initiatives such as the CSDP, then play the role of ensuring 
that the global OEM contracts with the local industry, such that these firms also benefit from 
public spending. The sad state of the local supplier industry, which according to Steve 
Jardine, needs to organise itself, has meant that it has in large part missed out, and will 
continue to miss out from contracts related to public infrastructure projects.  
5.3 Towards a growth and capabilities-enhancing political settlement?  
In the first section of this chapter, one analysed the different governance agencies charged 
with the implementation of the CSDP. This section aims to illuminate the distribution of 
power and power relations that underpin large scale capital spending on infrastructure in 
South Africa. Khan defines a political settlement as the relationship between formal and non-
formal institutions and the distribution of power in society. In particular, Khan analyses 
political settlements in developing countries through two dimensions, which this study 
employs; the organization of the ruling coalition and its relationship to the emerging 
productive sector. In the South African context, the latter can be seen as the‘re-emerging’ 
productive sector.  
With the end-user in the CSDP value-chain being Transnet, one would assume that the SOE 
is the locus of power when it comes to the implementation of the CSDP as a way of procuring 
rolling stock. This kind of analysis masks the political economy relationships that make it 
difficult to identify the central organisation that yields power over the localisation instrument 
or procedure. Such an analysis would invariably ignore the power dynamics and relationships 
from both sides of the public-private sector divide. An important concern is the nature of the 
organisations charged with legislative and regulatory oversight over public procurement and 
the CSDP in particular, and the organisations which provide supply and demand-side support 
and the distribution of capacities, competencies and resources financial or otherwise, among 
the organisations involved in the CSDP, in both the private and the public sector. An analysis 
that addresses these concerns will illuminate the political settlement that the CSDP is 
embedded in, and in so doing plays an important role in illuminating the dense web of state-
private sector relations that underpin large capital spending. This becomes more important if 
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one takes into account the prominent role placed on infrastructure spending (of which rolling 
stock is an integral part) in turning around South Africa’s socio-economic fortunes.  
5.3.1 The Organization of the Ruling Coalition in the CSDP  
In terms of the governance of the CSDP, there are legislative and implementation concerns 
that underpin the policy instrument. There are clear oversight issues, largely as they relate to 
the rules, procedures and criteria governing the CSDP. The organization of the administrative 
and legislative functions of the state in South Africa has largely followed what can be termed 
as a neoliberal approach. The neo-liberal and NPM approach to state economic planning and 
governance since the early 1990’s has continued to have an overriding impact on the 
organization of the state and its institutions. The idea behind the NPM influenced 
procurement reforms , was to decentralise procurement down to the departments and 
management level, and then hold accounting officers at that level, and even at municipal level 
responsible for spending and procurement decisions. These decisions would then be 
contrasted against the regulations issued by the National Treasury for compliance with the 
PPPFA and PFMA. 
Pons-Vignon and Segatti, argue that the particular form that public reform has taken in South 
Africa post 1994, has continued to frame all forms of state intervention in the economy;  
‘The systematic overhaul of the Department of Finance, and its National Treasury 
division….is a critical bureaucratic process which not only determined the nature and 
longevity of the new macro-economic policy framework but also conditioned all other forms 
of state intervention’ (Pons-Vignon & Segatti, 2013 , p. 568) 
Pons-Vignon and Segatti further argue that this public reform was underpinned by an 
increasingly overarching reach of the National Treasury in the affairs of other government 
institutions;  
‘combined with a broad public sector reform that soon moved from a developmentalist 
agenda to a more narrowly managerial one, this techno-structure and its increasing 
adherence to orthodox economics ensured a panoptical control over government activities at 
the service of fiscal restraint’ (Pons-Vignon & Segatti, 2013 , p. 569)  
This has made the National Treasury, a unique organisation within the state bureaucracy in 
South Africa. It is an organisation whose oversight powers and financial control are immense. 
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Moreover, its personnel and organizational capacity, ‘exhibit levels of professionalism which 
are exceptionally high by national standards’ (Pons-Vignon & Segatti, 2013 , p. 569).  
The National Treasury has the most important oversight function as the custodian of the 
PPPFA, and as such issues instruction notes on how public procurement in designated sectors 
should occur. Instruction notes serve the purpose of regulating the environment within which 
accounting officers and authorities may procure rolling stock which has been designated for 
local production and content (Treasury, 2012).Interviews with officials from the National 
Treasury were difficult, if not impossible, to come by due to busy schedules and one assumes, 
nervousness on the part of many of these officials to speak about, what is a sensitive issue. 
The lack of first-hand insights from these officials has limited and handicapped the study to 
some extent, in its attempted to illuminate the dense web of relations within the state and 
between the state and private commercial and industrial interests, as a sector of society.  
Many of the respondents interviewed in this study, and those found in other sources, made 
reference to the seeming disconnect between the PPPFA, and the other pieces of legislation 
outlining the use of public procurement for industrial development. Garry Pita, responding to 
the apparent divergence in approach between the legislative and policy provisions around 
procurement by state owned companies;  
‘Look, the fact is, and we are not going to lie about it, is that there is an element of 
disconnect between the PPPFA and all the other aspects that we are trying to achieve such as 
our supplier development objectives, job creation etc.’ (Pita, 2014)  
Pita argued that the PPFA doesn’t allow the procurement process to extract more localisation 
and local content, than that outlined in the PPPFA.  
‘The PPPFA doesn’t really allow you to go over and above that, it says that fifty percent 
local content, and let’s say for argument’s sake diesel locomotives are fifty percent and 
electric locomotives are sixty percent. I can get more than that so why is that the threshold? 
Why can’t it just be a minimum, and it will allow me to make a threshold that I believe goes 
to my market research, so that is one issue with the PPPFA’ (Pita, 2014) 
Further, on the question of other equity objectives, such as broad-based black economic 
empowerment (BBBEE), Pita argued that the PPPFA legislation stands at odds with the 
methodology that Transnet aims to deploy, to draw out more developmental outcomes from 
its capital spend;  
A Political Economy Review of the Transnet Freight Rail Competitive Supplier Development 
Programme.  
 
58 
 
‘The other issue is the 90/10, why is ten percent the maximum for BEE? If we are trying to 
create change within ownership within supplier development, within enterprise development 
in this country, then that is not really an incentive, in fact your larger traditional OEMs or 
white-owned businesses in South Africa that have had a lot of success in the past because of 
the previous regime, they might score badly then on BEE but beat other new entrants on 
price and that is not trying to achieve the objectives that the government is trying to achieve’ 
Reconciling the different pieces of legislation and the new methodologies adopted by the 
SOE, needs to be a priority if the CSDP is to succeed as a policy instrument. Pita highlighted 
the need for sustained dialogue between the different governance and oversight agencies over 
the CSDP, in order to ensure coherence in methodology and implementation.  
6.3.2 The new political settlement: a developmental evaluation methodology? 
Transnet has ventured, to renegotiate the basis of power in terms of state procurement and its 
envisaged methodology to achieve the socio-economic and industrial outcomes envisaged by 
the current government. That the government has prioritised infrastructure spending as a 
source of growth and employment in this decade and beyond, goes without saying. This has 
highlighted, as Garry Pita noted, the need to develop new methodologies to draw out 
industrial enablers and innovative forms of protection and encouragement for the local 
industry (Pita, 2014). In the process, these new methodologies have called in to question the 
adequacy or inadequacy of existing legislation and its implementation in the form of 
regulatory provisions issued by the institutions charged with custody and oversight over these 
pieces of legislation and policy. This search for new ways to carry out procurement, calls in 
to sharp focus, the need to align legislation with the need to rectify historic economic 
inequities in access to resources and industrial means of accumulation. In essence, legislation 
needs to be aligned to the need, to draw from Lee, to create the conditions for new ‘black’ 
economic forces to emerge, accompanied by new productive structures and forms of 
accumulation. Our ‘big-push’ needs to be premised on transforming a centuries-old landscape 
of accumulation, a tall order indeed.  
Pita argues that the new methodology has aimed to create new economic forces of 
accumulation, particularly among the historically disadvantaged sections of the population, 
by allowing for Transnet to have greater power in the award of contracts to firms which take 
long term industrial development and transformation seriously;  
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‘..because we realised that there is an issue (with the CSDP and PPPFA), in the interim we 
have created a new methodology that aligns to trying to maximise the developmental 
objectives. So for example in our tenders we will do ninety ten, but we will have a supply 
development pre-qualification that says if you do not sign up to say that you are going to 
invest fifty percent contract value in all these supply development objectives, you do not even 
come past the gate to tender again’ (Pita, 2014).  
This new methodology, has in a way created a new way of procuring in one significant way. 
It has created a differentiator that the PPPFA in no way makes provision for. In the sense that 
only firms which have met the supplier development objectives will be able to bid for 
Transnet contracts. Garry Pita notes, that in the previous system, one could not do this;  
‘So I have got a pre-qualification and I have got a threshold for us to be able to allow tenders 
to either go in or out and if they can’t meet those objectives then they are out. The only 
problem with that is by me not putting them in evaluation and only having ninety ten and not 
having supplier development in the evaluation or a BEE additional, I can’t create a 
differentiator’ 
However, even in the face of such differentiation, the PPPFA due to its insistence on price 
competitiveness continues to make developmental procurement praxis difficult as Pita 
observes; 
‘…..if you are tenderer A , I am tenderer B, and the pre-qualification is 45% and you can 
give me 80% and I as tenderer B can provide 46% and our prices are the same or lets say I 
am R1 cheaper, I will win but yet you would offer eighty percent in terms of supplier 
development which is far more beneficial for South Africa, the PPPFA doesn’t allow you to 
do that differentiator’ (Pita, 2014) 
The case for legislative reform in order to align and improve the working of the government’s 
policy instruments is clear. There is a need for policy coherence across the government, in the 
instruments it uses, and the legislative provisions that regulate the use of those instruments. 
The public procurement legislation is but one of these pieces of legislation.  
5.3.3 Programmatic vs. Transactional Procurement: a new praxis.  
Transnet’s supply chain policy, commits itself to programmatic or strategic procurement, as 
opposed to transactional procurement (Transnet, Transnet Supplier Development Plan , 
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2008). The study has already highlighted the need to build globally relevant capabilities in 
the local industry, in order to make it globally competitive. Transnet, in responding to the 
concern raised by the local supplier industry that there isn’t enough time for the local industry 
to upscale and upskill itself to benefit from Transnet contracts, has articulated its aim of 
achieving a programmatic procurement regime. Pita notes in relation to the design 
capabilities that the local industry needs to develop;  
‘ I think (the local supplier industry) has a long way to go in terms of their design 
capabilities, so that is why Transnet and Eskom are entering into much longer term contracts 
and RFPs to create programmatic change, as opposed to transactional procurement. It (the 
new method) is a programmatic procurement, a programme of a thousand locomotives, of a 
hundred and twenty five per year type of thing or two hundred a year which can create a 
stable pattern of demand so the South African supplier community can learn and grow with it 
so that by the end of it we must be good’ (Pita, 2014) 
This new programmatic approach, as opposed to a ‘piecemeal type of procurement’, is in 
clear conversation with the notions of creating an enabling environment for learning, as 
outlined by Khan (2010. Moreover, this long term view of leveraging purchases over a longer 
temporal horizon presents a new and interesting praxis of carrying out public procurement in 
pursuit of developmental industrial outcomes, and only time will tell whether this approach 
will be beneficial or detrimental, to the developmental project pursued by the self-styled 
developmental state in South Africa.  
5.4 Parting Reflections  
The interaction between governance agencies, firm structures and a broadly-defined political 
settlement underlying the CSDP as a state policy instrument, have provided interesting 
insights. Three main overriding insights emerge.  
Firstly, when one looks at the intra-departmental tensions that the CSDP process has laid 
bare, one can clearly see that the current tensions around what Transnet wishes to do, with 
regard to using its spending as a means of industrial diversification and building a domestic, 
black industrial class, are a typical result of the kind of SOE that Transnet is. What is meant 
by this? Roger Southall in his discussion of the restructuring of South African SOEs, talks 
about how the ANC government’s aspirations to become a developmental state have in the 
early years of the current dispensation had to stand up against a market-friendly restructuring 
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of SOEs and the need to racially transform the South African economy (Southall, 2007 ). 
There is a clear indication that Transnet has had since it started operating under that name, in 
1989, to be a cost-cutting and highly bottom-line conscious organisation in pursuit of 
commercial profit as opposed to developmental goals. This coupled with later privatisation, 
albeit on a less than significant scale, has meant that Transnet has always has had to be 
conscious and aware of its commercial imperatives and a regulatory environment which 
adhered to the fiscally conservative macroeconomic framework, GEAR, that South Africa 
had since adopted. There has been however, an added complexity, with the DPE from the 
time it was under Alec Erwin’s stewardship, seeing the SOEs as important drivers of growth 
and development (Southall, 2007 ). This has also been complemented by the ANC 
government’s need to deal with the growing impatience of the black majority at the pace of 
economic transformation, such that there was a shift in thinking towards using the state and 
its parastatals as key sites of transformation. As Southall notes, that the shift, ‘reflecting 
government’s growing disillusion with the capacity of the private sector to bridge the 
alarming gap between the ‘two economies’, indicated aspirations towards a much more 
stronger and interventionist state’ (Southall, 2007 , p. 210). Therefore, as part of this shift, the 
state in framing parastatals as key sites of transformation, aimed to use two tools to achieve 
this, staffing and procurement. What this study, then posits as a tension, with regard to the 
latter, is the increasing frustration and acknowledgement within Transnet, that the regulatory 
environment may thwart their intentions of using parastatal procurement as a means of 
transforming the local economy, and creating new forces of accumulation among the 
previously disadvantaged. Moreover, what this tension between the imperatives of 
restructuring and transformation indicates, is a bigger tension at a policy and legislative level, 
and realised through intra-departmental tension between a more commercial versus a 
developmental view of the SOEs, and how the role and powers given to different departments 
play a role in managing, or failing to manage, the underlying ideological tensions. This 
represents a central tension and concern within the political settlement around the CSDP.  
Secondly, what the analysis presented in the last two chapters indicates, is a deeply 
fragmented state, and this has in turn had a profound impact on how it relates to other sectors 
of society, in particular suppliers in the rail sector. It is however, a state that is fully aware of 
the need to create institutions vested with enough power to regulate and co-ordinate 
economic transactions and activities of state organs. The challenge in South Africa, then 
becomes the nature and orientation of the institutions charged with such regulatory and 
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oversight powers, and whether this complements the developmental aspirations of the 
government as a whole. The delay over the evaluation criteria for the ‘ten-sixty four’ 
contract, is seemingly an indication of how these tensions can play themselves out in a 
manner that stalls urgent investment, with significant implications for the domestic economy. 
More importantly, as the multi-layered relationships between the governance agencies 
represented in the preceding analysis indicates, the state in its economic functions is 
fragmented with the lion’s share of regulation and oversight occurring at the level of the 
National Treasury, with limited ability to co-ordinate or articulate a clear distribution of 
power between the different institutions that would manage the underlying tensions between 
existing policy and the developmental aims of the state.  
Lastly, in avoiding the often misleading dichotomy between state and market, it is often 
useful, as Ben Fine notes, to identify the underlying economic and political interests and how 
these interests are represented through state and market. In the ANC government’s quest for 
economic transformation that can resolve the national question of race in South Africa there 
is a need to outline how certain interests within both the state and the market stand to benefit 
from state policy aimed at creating a black and patriotic industrial class that can benefit from 
large capital spending by the state. Southall observes, that as parastatals are defined as key 
sites of transformation this, ‘entailed that there would be winners and losers and implied that 
there would be struggles and controversies which would be disruptive to the smooth running 
of what were all highly complex organisations’ (Southall, 2007 , p. 210). There has been a 
heavy emphasis, on the part of Transnet as can be seen in the comments made by Garry Pita 
that historically disadvantaged interests need to be placed at the centre of the company’s large 
capital spending. There has been overriding tension however, around how the regulations and 
oversight framework on the one hand makes it difficult to draw out and leverage more 
opportunities for black owned businesses. There is a concern that the current framework, 
legislatively, may lead to the promotion of two particular interests, white established 
industrialists and TRE, at the expense of creating new commercial interests among the black 
majority. Whether Transnet wishes to use TRE as a means to internally leverage the capital 
spending of other Transnet subsidiaries, and directly influence transformation outcomes, is a 
moot point. However, it is clear, that there is a degree of mistrust or miscommunication 
between the local supplier industry and Transnet.  
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At a commercial level, there is the real difficulty which was presented in the preceding 
chapter, of developing a class of black industrialists soon enough, to benefit from the large 
spending which will be rolled out over the next decade. The fear and tension within the ANC, 
is around whether large capital spending of this nature may bolster established white 
industrial interests, with very little in terms of direct ties to the ruling ANC and whose long 
term interests in terms of national developmental aspirations around BEE, employment and 
investment may be different to those of the ruling coalition. As Steve Jardine notes,  
‘the local supplier industry is inefficient, antiquated and stuck in a debt spiral, and BEE is 
the last thing on their minds’ (Jardine, 2013) 
The resolution of all these tensions, as proposed by Transnet through programmatic as 
opposed to transactional procurement, may go a long way in ensuring that the market 
structure of the local supplier industry, is able to transform and reflect interests whose 
developmental orientation and objectives are in line with the transformation objectives of 
Transnet, and the ruling coalition as a whole. However, if the comment above, is anything to 
go by, then a more long term and institutionalised procurement schedule, such as that 
proposed by Transnet, will have to assist in altering the behaviour of the local supplier 
industry in two fundamental ways. The first of which, would require the local industry to 
prioritise BEE, in the form of ownership, and possible worker involvement in the 
management and operational activities of local supplier firms, the second would require 
significant investments in industrial capability and local synergies with other relevant local 
and preferably black industrial interests, will allow these firms to be responsive to the kind of 
SOE-private sector engagement required by the CSDP.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
There have been notable success with regard to the CSDP, and these have been mentioned in 
the study. Moreover, the shift towards a programmatic procurement regime presents 
significant possibility for the state to leverage its own spending in a manner that it can 
enforce and monitor, for continuous improvement and innovation in the long term. The 
advent of the CSDP, as two of the interviewees from Transnet and the DPE noted, has created 
an acknowledgement of and sensitivity to the need to incorporate supplier and industrial 
development in the praxis of supply chain management.  It is however, the challenges that 
this study has found notably important, and these require final mention here. 
 
Firstly, it is clear that there is a contestation around how the state should intervene in the 
economy within the state, and how parastatals should be used to achieve this, and whether or 
not these parastatals should play a direct role in the market in competition with the very 
interests that the CSDP and Transnet’s SD policy aim to develop and encourage. Moreover 
this reflects across the state and the market, contestations around a strictly balance-sheet 
focused view of SOEs as commercial enterprises that should be subject to the same 
competitive environment and conditions of accumulation as other actors in the rail sector 
when it comes to state contracts, as opposed to a more interventionist state, with enterprises 
that play a direct and ‘developmental role in ensuring the achievement of socio-economic 
transformation objectives.  
 
Secondly, there is an indication of a state that is fragmented in terms of its approach to 
industrial policy, and the use of the instruments at its disposal in that regard. What became 
clear early on, was that the state, in its functional roles was largely a site of contest between 
those who have had to oversee compliance to fiscal regulations tied to the overall state 
macroeconomic framework, and those who feel that the state needs to intervene more in 
pursuit of industrial and socio-economic transformation, over and above the bounds set by the 
macroeconomic policy framework. This has led to a situation where the National Treasury, 
plays a strong co-ordinating role of different state institutions due to its financial and policy 
oversight over public procurement, but very little co-ordination in terms of ensuring that the 
non-financial activities such as communication with different stakeholders, co-ordinated 
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planning of how related stated instruments can be used in tandem with the CSDP and other 
SD measures. Without internal coherence and a clearly co-ordinated means of creating 
functional and institutional links between the different government departments and 
instruments that the CSDP consists of, the programme is unlikely to succeed.  
 
Lastly, as Lee notes, the state needs to alter the conditions of accumulation for underlying 
economic and political interests, but moreover it needs to create new economic interests. By 
fashioning itself as a developmental state, the state has identified the need to create the 
motive forces that will benefit from such a developmental and possibly interventionist stance. 
These interests have been clearly identified as the historically disadvantaged black majority, 
which needs to produce its own industrial class in the mould of the patriotic elites of the East 
Asian developmental states. In this regard, SOE procurement policy has for long been 
targeted as an important means of ensuring the upward class mobility and industrial success 
of this group of interests. Have these attempts been successful? The study clearly indicates 
that there has been minimal success in this regard . One of the reasons for this has been a 
challenge internal to the state. It is clear, that different state institutions hold different views, 
from those with an inherent nervousness about the possibilities of clientelist rent-seeking 
culture emerging within the state, to those who understand that the development of new 
productive forces seldom occurs in rent-free environments, there is a wide cross-section of 
thinking and schools of thought within the state. What seems to be emerging is a middle road 
that is becoming more attuned to policy which skews competitive norms in pursuit of 
domestic industrialisation in an economically unequal world. This will represent interesting 
possibilities for the development of a new thinking around industrialisation and re-
industrialisation in emerging economies. However, at present, it is clear that there is a tension 
around whether or not programmes like the CSDP can churn out such an industrial class 
quickly enough to benefit from the large capital spending, and whether programmes such as 
the CSDP will serve to provide support to existing white industrial interests at the expense of 
creating a new class of industrial interests among the previously disadvantaged.  It is 
interesting that the state has not found it difficult to provide support for white corporate 
interests, with minimal black ownership and representation, in other sectors such as 
telecommunications, mining and finance. One wonders whether this is the model envisaged 
by the state when it comes to the rail manufacturing sector.  
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This study, in analysing the Transnet’s programme aimed at leveraging procurement, has 
sought to illuminate the fragmented nature of the state, and the character of its intended and 
actual relationship with private sector interests in South Africa. Moreover, it presents an 
analysis of a state enterprise charged with meeting socio-economic expectations, in an 
environment framed by a rather conservative macroeconomic framework. The contestations 
that emerge from such a policy environment, and how they play themselves out in the state 
and market, have important implications for public procurement praxis. In fashioning itself as 
a developmental state, the South African state has embarked on a process through measures 
such as the CSDP, aimed at forming a constellation of economic, political and ideological 
interests that can in complementary action ensure that developmental and transformational 
policy is actualised and reflected in outcomes and praxis. This will go a long way in making 
the developmental state aspirations of the ANC government seem somewhat realistic and 
realisable, however a lot more needs to be done.  
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